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Abstract— As our ground transportation infrastructure mod-
ernizes, the large amount of data being measured, transmitted,
and stored motivates an analysis of the privacy aspect of these
emerging cyber-physical technologies. In this paper, we consider
privacy in the routing game, where the origins and destinations
of drivers are considered private. This is motivated by the fact
that this spatiotemporal information can easily be used as the
basis for inferences for a person’s activities. More specifically,
we consider the differential privacy of the mapping from the
amount of flow for each origin-destination pair to the traffic
flow measurements on each link of a traffic network. We
use a stochastic online learning framework for the population
dynamics, which is known to converge to the Nash equilibrium
of the routing game. We analyze the sensitivity of this process
and provide theoretical guarantees on the convergence rates as
well as differential privacy values for these models. We confirm
these with simulations on a small example.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the decreasing cost and size of technologies, our
ground transportation infrastructure is increasingly mod-
ernizing with new sensor systems, control algorithms, and
actuation modalities. Although these technologies promise
great gains in traffic performance, such as level of service
or equity [1], an unprecedented amount of data is being
measured, transmitted, and stored, and an analysis of the
privacy aspect of this emerging cyber-physical technology is
needed.
There have been a multitude of privacy conceptions in
the philosophical and legal literatures. From an engineering
perspective, the most commonly used paradigms are control
over information and secrecy [2].
In the abstract, control over information generally requires
transparency to the person about what data is being collected
and stored, consent to the transmission of this data to any
parties, and an ability to correct mistakes in the data. As an
example of how this conception works in practice, control
over information forms the foundation of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Fair Information Practices.
On the other hand, secrecy focuses on which new infer-
ences can be made about a person due to the information
contained in the data; in this paradigm, a privacy breach
occurs when there is a revelation of information that was
previously not known, and the person felt that the informa-
tion was private.
Throughout this paper, our conception of privacy will
focus on the secrecy paradigm. In other words, we will focus
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on what new inferences can be made from the data collected
by sensors in ground traffic infrastructures.
In the context of traffic systems, we consider the case
where the origin and destination are considered private. This
is motivated by the fact that this spatiotemporal information
can easily used as the basis for inferences for a person’s ac-
tivities. For example, an executive at the carsharing company
Uber claimed he could tell when its users were having an
affair in a blog post [3].
More specifically, we consider the differential privacy
of the mapping from population sizes, i.e. the amount of
flow for each origin-destination pair, to the traffic flow
measurements on each link of a traffic network.
A popular modeling assumption is that the traffic flow is
atomless, i.e. a single vehicle cannot unilaterally affect the
flows on links [4], [5], [6]. This is designed to match our
intuition that, under normal conditions, one vehicle does not
contribute significantly to traffic.
However, this implies that, through our models, one vehi-
cle has no effect on the traffic flow measurements. Thus, in
this paper, we consider differential privacy with respect to
population sizes: how much does traffic flow change when
a non-negligible mass of vehicles switch origin-destination
pairs?
This framework is applicable for when some aggregator
wants to protect the privacy of several drivers. For example,
Google can analyze how much it reveals about its users
when it provides routes through Google Maps. Alternatively,
companies can consider how much is revealed through their
shipping patterns, since this detailed data can allow infer-
ences about important business information, such as which
consumer markets are being targeted, which companies are
in the supply chain, and which locations have potential for
future expansion.
To model the dynamics of the driver populations, we
use an online learning model in which, at iteration t, each
population chooses a distribution over its paths. The joint
decision of all populations determines the flows over the
edges of the network, which, in turn, determines the costs
over paths. These costs are then revealed to the populations,
and given this information, they can update their distribu-
tions. This online learning model has been applied to routing
games in [7], where the authors show that any no-regret
strategy is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. The
same model is also used in [8], where the authors show that
if each population applies a mirror descent algorithm, the
joint distribution converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Our contribution is an analysis of the differential privacy
of the dynamics of the driver populations. In this article, we
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consider a stochastic version of the model in [8], in which the
populations only have access to a noisy measurement of the
path costs. The presence of noise is essential in providing dif-
ferential privacy, while still guaranteeing convergence to the
equilibrium, using results from stochastic optimization [9],
[10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review the engineering literature on privacy and develop
some of the theory of differential privacy. In Section III,
we introduce the routing game in the context of privacy.
In Sections IV and V, we provide a learning model based
on stochastic mirror descent. Here, we present theory on
convergence rates and analyze the differential privacy of the
routing game. In Section VI, we present a numerical example
and we conclude in Section VII.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
A. Previous work
Motivated by changing technologies, there has been a lot
of recent research considering the issue of privacy. In this
section, we will try to summarize the mathematical results
in this line of research most relevant to this paper, noting
both that the field is too rich for a comprehensive literature
review and that privacy is a complicated social phenomenon
of which a mathematical model is only one facet.
From a mathematical perspective, there have been several
definitions of privacy. We seek to quickly survey a few
definitions.
There has been work in inferential privacy, which seeks
to bound the probability an adversary with a fixed set of
information can correctly infer a hidden parameter, and uses
a hypothesis testing model [11].
Additionally, there has been work in information-theoretic
based definitions of privacy, which uses the mutual in-
formation between a private parameter and the publicly
observable data [12], [13] or the conditional entropy of a
private parameter given the observables [14].
Throughout this paper, we will focus on a definition of
privacy first introduced in [15], called differential privacy.
This definition was originally designed for databases taking
values in a finite alphabet, but has since been extended to
consider the output of optimization algorithms [16], [17],
[18], [19] and dynamical systems [20]. For a more detailed
analysis of the interpretation of differential privacy, we refer
the reader to [21].
Our work is closest to that in [19], where the authors
considered the differential privacy of constraint sets in the
context of gradient descent. Additionally, the work in [16]
is of relevance, as it provides several minimax bounds for
stochastic mirror descent, considered in this paper.
B. Theory
In this section, we will formally define differential privacy,
as well as present results needed in future sections.
First, let (Ω,A, P ) denote our underlying probability
space. Also, let Θ be a set equipped with a symmetric
binary relation Adj, called the adjacency relation. The set
Θ contains the possible values for a private parameter.
Intuitively, the adjacency relation indicates which values
should be roughly indistinguishable from the observable data.
Although we never consider distributions or measures on Θ,
for brevity we will often treat Θ as a measurable space,
where any subset of Θ is measurable.
Furthermore, let (S,S) denote a measurable space and let
Y : Θ×Ω→ S be a mapping such that Y (θ, ·) is measurable
for every θ ∈ Θ. In other words, given θ, Y (θ, ·) is a random
element in S. For shorthand, we will write Yθ to represent
Y (θ, ·).
We can now present the definition of differential privacy.
Definition 1. Differential privacy: We say a measurable
mapping Y : Θ × Ω → S is (, δ)-differentially-private if
for all measurable sets B ∈ S and any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that
Adj(θ, θ′):
P (Yθ ∈ B) ≤ exp()P (Yθ′ ∈ B) + δ (1)
If δ = 0, we will say this mapping is -differentially-private.
We note two consequences of this definition. The first
lemma appears in [20].
Lemma 1. [20]: If a mapping Y is (, δ)-differentially
private then
Eg(Yθ) ≤ exp()Eg(Yθ′) + δ (2)
holds for all bounded measurable real-valued functions g
and all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that Adj(θ, θ′).
The second lemma allows us to use tail bounds when
analyzing differential privacy in certain contexts as we will
see in Section IV.
Lemma 2. Fix some event E. Suppose P (E) ≥ 1− δ′ and
that, for all measurable sets B ∈ S and all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such
that Adj(θ, θ′):
P ({Yθ ∈ B} ∩ E) ≤ exp()P ({Yθ′ ∈ B} ∩ E) + δ
Then, Y is (, δ + δ′)-differentially-private.
Proof. Fix any measurable set B ∈ S and any adjacent
θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. Then:
P (Yθ ∈ B)
= P ({Yθ ∈ B} ∩ E) + P ({Yθ ∈ B} ∩ Ec)
≤ exp()P ({Yθ′ ∈ B} ∩ E) + δ + δ′
As desired.
A result we will use in future sections is how differentially
private mappings can be composed.
Proposition 1. Adaptive composition: Suppose Y1 : Θ ×
Ω→ S1 is (1, δ1)-differentially-private and Y2 : Θ× S1 ×
Ω → S2 is a measurable mapping such that Y2(·, s, ·) is
(2, δ2)-differentially-private for each fixed s ∈ S1. Then
the mapping (θ, ω) 7→ (Y1(θ, ω), Y2(θ, Y1(θ, ω), ω)) is (1 +
2, exp(2)δ1 + δ2)-differentially-private.
Proof. Pick any set A ∈ S1 × S2. Let µ1(θ, ·) denote the
distribution of Y1(θ) and µ2(θ, s, ·) denote the distribution
of Y2(θ, s). Furthermore, for y ∈ S1, let Ay = {y′ ∈ S2 :
(y, y′) ∈ A} denote the slice of A with respect to the first
coordinate. Then, for any θ, θ′ such that Adj(θ, θ′):
P [(Y1(θ), Y2(θ, Y1(θ))) ∈ A]
=
∫
µ1(θ, dy1)P (Y2(θ, y1) ∈ Ay1)
≤
∫
µ1(θ, dy1)[exp(2)P (Y2(θ
′, y1) ∈ Ay1) + δ2]
= exp(2)
∫
µ1(θ, dy1)[P (Y2(θ
′, y1) ∈ Ay1)] + δ2
Let g(y) = P (Y2(θ′, y) ∈ Ay), and note both that
g is a bounded, measurable function and Eg(Y1(θ′)) =
P ((Y1(θ
′), Y2(θ′, Y1(θ′))) ∈ A). So, invoking Lemma 1:
P [(Y1(θ), Y2(θ, Y1(θ))) ∈ A]
≤ exp(2)
∫
µ1(θ, dy1)[P (Y2(θ
′, y1) ∈ Ay1)] + δ2
= exp(2)Eg(Y1(θ)) + δ2
≤ exp(2)[exp(1)Eg(Y1(θ′)) + δ1] + δ2
= exp(1 + 2)P ((Y1(θ
′), Y2(θ′, Y1(θ′))) ∈ A) + . . .
exp(2)δ1 + δ2
As desired.
Additionally, we can induct on Proposition 1. For brevity,
we will sometimes write Yt(θ, Y1(θ), . . . , Yt−1(θ), ·) simply
as Yt(θ).
Corollary 1. Repeated adaptive composition: Suppose Y1 :
Θ × Ω → S1 is (1, δ1)-differentially-private and Yt : Θ ×
S1× . . . St−1×Ω→ St is a measurable mapping such that
Yt(·, s1, . . . , st−1, ·) is (t, δt)-differentially-private for each
fixed (s1, . . . , st−1) ∈ S1 × · · · × St−1 and 1 < t ≤ T .
Then, the mapping (θ, ω) 7→ (Y1(θ), Y2(θ), . . . , YT (θ))
is
(∑T
t=1 t,
∑T
t=1 exp
[∑T
t′=t+1 t′
]
δt
)
-differentially-
private.
Finally, we note that the Gaussian distribution guarantees
differential privacy.
Definition 2. Sensitivity: The `2 sensitivity of a function
f : Θ→ R is given by:
∆2f = sup
θ,θ′∈Θ:Adj(θ,θ′)
‖f(θ)− f(θ′)‖2 (3)
Definition 3. The zero-mean Gaussian distribution on R with
variance parameter σ2, denoted Gauss(σ2), has the density
y 7→ 1√
(2piσ2)
exp
(−|y|2
2σ2
)
(4)
with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Proposition 2. Gaussian mechanism [21]: For  ∈ (0, 1),
and b2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ), the mapping Yθ = f(θ) + Z,
where Zi
iid∼ Gauss(σ2) for some σ ≥ b∆2f/, is (, δ)-
differentially-private.
III. THE ROUTING GAME
The routing game is given by:
• a directed graph G = (V,E),
• a set of non-decreasing, Lipschitz continuous edge cost
functions ce : R+ → R+, e ∈ E,
• a finite set of origin-destination pairs (oi, di) ∈ V × V ,
indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
• and a finite set of populations Pk, indexed by k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}.
In a ground transportation setting, the nodes, i.e. elements
in V , represent physical locations, and edges, i.e. elements
in E, represent the roadways that connect two locations.
The edge cost functions ce correspond to the amount of
time taken when traveling along an edge e, and the non-
decreasing assumption corresponds to the physical intuition
that congestion worsens travel time. Finally, each population
represents some aggregator that manages flows for all origin-
destination pairs, such as Google or Waze.
For a given origin-destination pair (oi, di), let Pi be the set
of simple paths connecting oi to di, and let Mi ∈ R|E|×|Pi|
be the edge-path incidence matrix, defined as follows:
∀(e, p) ∈ E × Pi, (Mi)e,p =
{
1 if e ∈ p
0 otherwise.
(5)
A population Pk is given by a private vector θk ∈ RI+,
which specifies, for each origin-destination pair (oi, di), the
total mass of traffic (θk)i that belongs to this population, and
that travels from oi to di. We assume there is some upper
bound on the total size of the populations. Furthermore, we
will define an adjacency relationship between private vectors.
Assumption 1. It is common knowledge that θ is bounded.
That is, there exists an Aθ < ∞ such that, for every
population k, ‖θk‖∞ ≤ Aθ, and each population and outside
observers know this bound.
Definition 4. Two private parameters of populations
(θk)k∈[K] and (θ′k)k∈[K] are adjacent if there exists a k
∗
such that θk = θ′k for k 6= k∗ and:
‖θk∗ − θ′k∗‖∞ ≤ c
Recall that the adjacency relationship provides defines
which pairs of private parameters should be roughly indis-
tinguishable. Here, c is a constant that will be determined
by the populations, modeling the maximum amount that a
single population can increase or decrease the flow in one
origin-destination pair without having a significant effect on
observable data.
The action set of population Pk is a distribution vector
xk ∈ ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI , where
∆Pi =
m ∈ R|Pi|+ : ∑
p∈Pi
mp = 1

is the set of probability distributions over Pi. In other words,
every population chooses, for each origin-destination pair
(oi, di), how to distribute its mass across the available paths
Pi. For notational convenience, we will write (xk)Pi to
denote the sub-vector ((xk)p)p∈Pi ∈ ∆Pi , so that xk =
((xk)P1 , . . . , (xk)PI ).
The flow allocations of all populations (xk)k∈[K] deter-
mine the edge flows, defined as follows: the flow on edge e
is φe(x1, . . . , xK) =
∑K
k=1
∑I
i=1(θk)i
∑
p∈Pi(xk)p1(e∈p).
The vector of edge flows can be written simply in terms of
the incidence matrices:
φ(x1, . . . , xK) =
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
(θk)iMi(xk)Pi
The edge flows and edge costs determine the path costs. That
is, the cost on path p ∈ Pi is given by:
`p(x1, . . . , xK) =
∑
e∈p
ce(φe(x1, . . . , xK))
We will denote by `Pi(x1, . . . , xK) the vector
(`p(x1, . . . , xK))p∈Pi , and ` = (`P1 , . . . , `PI ) ∈
RP1+ × · · · × RPI+ .
Finally, the cost for population Pk under distributions
x1, . . . , xK is
I∑
i=1
(θk)i
∑
p∈Pi
((xk)Pi)p`p(x1, . . . , xK)
which we will denote, more concisely, as
〈xk, `(x1, . . . , xK)〉θk
where we define the inner product as follows: for all x, y ∈
RP1 × · · · × RPI
〈x, y〉θ =
I∑
i=1
θi
∑
p∈Pi
xpyp (6)
A. Nash equilibria and the Rosenthal potential function
Definition 5. A collection of population distributions
(xk)k∈[K] is a Nash equilibrium (also called Wardrop equi-
librium in the traffic literature), if for every k ∈ [K] and
every y ∈ ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI :
〈xk, `(x1, . . . xK)〉θk ≤ 〈y, `(x1, . . . xK)〉θk
That is, no driver can improve their cost by unilaterally
changing their path.
Next, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the game
are exactly the set of minimizers of the Rosenthal potential,
defined as follows:
f(x1, . . . , xK) =
∑
e∈E
∫ φe(x1,...,xK)
0
ce(u)du
Proposition 3. The Rosenthal potential is convex, and its
gradient with respect to xk is:
∇xkf(x1, . . . , xK) =
I∑
i=1
(θk)i`Pi(x1, . . . , xK)
Corollary 2. The set of Nash equilibria of the game is
exactly the set of solutions of the following convex problem:
minimize f(x1, . . . , xK)
subject to xk ∈ ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI for all k ∈ [K]
(7)
Algorithm 1 Stochastic mirror descent dynamics for popu-
lation k, with initial distribution x(0)k , learning rates (η
(t)
k ),
and distance generating function ψk.
for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} do
Observe ˆ`(t)
Update
x
(t+1)
k = argmin
xk∈∆P1×···×∆PI
〈
ˆ`(t), xk
〉
θk
+
1
η
(t)
k
Dψk (xk, x
(t)
k )
end for
IV. STOCHASTIC MIRROR DESCENT DYNAMICS AND
CONVERGENCE TO NASH EQUILIBRIA
A. Online learning model
We consider the following online learning model of the
game: at each iteration t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, every population
Pk chooses a distribution vector x
(t)
k ∈ ∆P1 × · · · × ∆PI .
The combined choice of all populations determines the path
loss vector `(x(t)1 , . . . , x
(t)
K ), which we will denote simply
by `(t). The loss of population k is then given by the inner
product
〈
`(t), x
(t)
k
〉
θk
.
At the end of iteration t, a stochastic loss vector ˆ`(t), is
revealed to all populations. Intuitively, one can think of ˆ`(t)
as a noisy version of `(t). The precise assumptions on the
process (ˆ`(t)) will be given in Assumption 5.
B. Population dynamics
Our population dynamics take the following form.
Assumption 2. We assume that for each population Pk, the
stochastic process (x(t)k ) follows stochastic mirror descent
dynamics, given in Algorithm 1.
These dynamics correspond to a stochastic version of the
dynamics used in [8].
Here, ψk is a distance generating function defined and C1
on ∆P1 × · · · × ∆PI , and Dψk is the Bregman divergence
induced by ψk, defined as follows:
Dψk(xk, yk) = ψ(xk)−ψ(yk)−〈∇ψ(yk), xk − yk〉 (8)
Assumption 3. For all k, ψk is strongly convex with respect
to a reference norm ‖ · ‖. That is, there exists `ψk > 0 such
that for all xk, yk ∈ ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI :
Dψk(xk, yk) ≥
`ψk
2
‖xk − yk‖2
See Chapter 11 in [22] for an account of the properties of
Bregman divergences. We will further assume that the norm
‖ ·‖ decomposes into a sum of norms defined on each of the
simplexes.
Assumption 4. The norm ‖ · ‖ on RP1 × · · · ×RPI can be
decomposed as follows:
‖xk‖ =
∑
i∈I
‖(xk)Pi‖
Mirror descent is a general class of first-order optimization
methods, used extensively both in convex optimization [23]
and online learning [22], [24]. In particular, projected gra-
dient descent and entropic descent (a.k.a. the Hedge algo-
rithm) are instances of the mirror descent method, for the
appropriate choices of the distance generating function (see,
for example, [25]).
In our model, since each population is updating its distri-
bution vector using mirror descent dynamics, we can write
the joint update as follows
(x(t+1), . . . , x
(t+1)
K )
= arg min
x
∑
k
〈
`(t), xk
〉
θk
+
∑
k
1
η
(t)
k
Dψk(xk, x
(t)
k )
= arg min
x
〈
∇f(x(t)), x
〉
+
∑
k
1
η
(t)
k
Dψk(xk, x
(t)
k )
= arg min
x
f(x(t)) +
〈
∇f(x(t)), x− x(t)
〉
+D(t)(x, x(t))
(9)
where the minimization is taken across x in (∆P1 × · · · ×
∆PI )K and we used the expression of the gradient ∇f(x(t)),
given in Proposition 3, and defined:
D(t)(x, x(t)) =
∑
k
1
η
(t)
k
Dψk(xk, x
(t)
k )
The expression (9) can be interpreted as a local approxi-
mation of the potential function f : the first term f(x(t)) +〈∇f(x(t)), x− x(t)〉 is simply the linear approximation of f
around x(t), and the second term D(t)(x, x(t)) is a strongly
convex function which penalizes deviation from the previous
iterate x(t). By this observation, one can think of the joint
dynamics of all populations as implementing a stochastic
mirror descent on the Rosenthal potential f .
C. Suboptimality bounds on stochastic mirror descent
We now review some guarantees of the stochastic mirror
descent method. First, we need to make assumptions on
the stochastic process (ˆ`(t)) and the distance generating
functions ψk.
Assumption 5. Throughout the paper, we will assume that:
1) For all t, ˆ`(t) is unbiased, that is, E
[
ˆ`(t)|Ft−1
]
= `(t),
where (Ft) is the natural filtration of the process (ˆ`(t)).
2) ˆ`(t) is uniformly bounded in the squared dual norm,
that is, there exists L such that for all t:
E
[
‖`(t)‖2∗
]
≤ L
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm defined as follows:
‖`‖∗ = sup
‖x‖≤1
〈x, `〉
3) For all k, there exists Dk such that Dψk is bounded
on ∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI by Dk.
Proposition 4 (Theorem 4 in [10]). Suppose that each
population Pk follows a stochastic mirror descent dynamics
as in Algorithm 1, and suppose that the learning rates are
given by η(t)k = ckt
−αk with ck > 0 and αk ∈ (0, 1). Then
for all t ≥ 1, it holds that:
E
[
f(x(t))
]
− f?
≤
(
1 +
t∑
τ=1
1
τ
)
K∑
k=1
(
1
t1−αk
Dk
ck
+
ckL
2`ψk(1− αk)
1
tαk
)
In particular, the system converges to the set of Nash
equilibria in expectation, in the sense that E
[
f(x(t))
]→ f?
at the rate O(t−α¯ log t) where α¯ = mink min(αk, 1− αk).
D. Sensitivity analysis of the stochastic mirror descent up-
date
In this Section, we study the sensitivity of the stochastic
process ˆ`(t)(x(t)) to changes in the private parameter θ.
First, we consider how the flow allocations change due to
a change in mass on some origin-destination pairs. In this
case, we hold the observed loss vector ˆ`(t) fixed and will
invoke Corollary 1 afterward.
Proposition 5. Fix a loss vector ˆ`(t) and consider the
stochastic mirror descent update for population Pk
x
(t+1)
k (θk) = arg min
xk
〈
ˆ`(t), xk
〉
θk
+
1
η
(t)
k
Dψk(xk, x
(t)
k )
where the minimization is taken across ∆P1 × · · · × ∆PI .
Here, xk is viewed as a function of the mass vector θk. Then
for all θk, θ′k ∈ RI+:
‖x(t+1)k (θk)− x(t+1)k (θ′k)‖ ≤
η
(t)
k ‖ˆ`(t)‖∗
`ψk
‖θk − θ′k‖∞
Proof. The minimized function is differentiable on ∆P1 ×
· · · ×∆PI , and its gradient at xk is given by:
((θk)i ˆ`
(t)
Pi )i∈I +
1
η
(t)
k
[
∇ψk(xk)−∇ψk(x(t)k )
]
To simplify the following expressions, we will use the
following notation:
• x(t+1)k (θk) is denoted x
(t+1)
k , and x
(t+1)
k (θ
′
k) is denoted
x′(t+1).
• g(t)(θk) = ((θk)i ˆ`
(t)
Pi )i∈I
• h(t)k (xk) =
1
η
(t)
k
[
∇ψk(xk)−∇ψk(x(t)k )
]
Then, by first-order optimality, we must have for all xk ∈
∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI :〈
g(t)(θk) + h
(t)
k (x
(t+1)
k ), xk − x(t+1)k
〉
≥ 0
In particular, for xk = x′
(t+1), we have:〈
g(t)(θk) + h
(t)
k (x
(t+1)
k ), x
′
k
(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
≥ 0
Permuting the roles of θk and θ′k, and summing the resulting
inequalities, we have:〈
g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k), x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
≥〈
h
(t)
k (x
′
k
(t+1)
)− h(t)k (x(t+1)k ), x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
(10)
Furthermore, we have by Cauchy-Schwartz:〈
g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k), x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
≤ ‖g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k)‖∗‖x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k ‖
By strong convexity of ψk, we have:〈
h
(t)
k (x
′
k
(t+1)
)− h(t)k (x(t+1)k ), x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
=
1
η
(t)
k
〈
∇ψk(x′k(t+1))−∇ψk(x(t+1)k ), x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k
〉
≥ `ψk
η
(t)
k
‖x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k ‖2
Combining these inequalities with (10), we have:
‖g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k)‖∗‖x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k ‖
≥ `ψk
η
(t)
k
‖x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k ‖2
After simplification, this yields:
‖x′k(t+1) − x(t+1)k ‖ ≤
η
(t)
k
`ψk
‖g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k)‖∗
Finally, using the expression of g(t)(θk) = ((θk)i ˆ`
(t)
Pi )i∈I , we
have:
‖g(t)(θk)− g(t)(θ′k)‖∗ ≤
∑
i∈I
‖ˆ`(t)Pi‖∗|(θk)i − (θ′k)i|
≤ ‖ˆ`(t)‖∗‖θk − θ′k‖∞
which concludes the proof.
We have bounded how much a change in the private
parameter affects the distribution on paths. Now, we analyze
how the flows are affected by changes in distribution.
We will use the notation φ(x; θ), which makes
the dependence of edge flows on the parameter
θ explicit. Also, x(t+1)(θ) will be shorthand for
(x
(t+1)
1 (θ1), . . . , x
(t+1)
K (θK)). Also, let ‖ · ‖a denote
an arbitrary norm on the space of edge flows.
Lemma 3. For any Adj(θ, θ′), we have:
‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ)−φ(x(t+1)(θ′); θ′)‖a
≤ cAx
[
A∆ +Aθ
η
(t)
k ‖ˆ`(t)‖∗
`ψk
]
Here, Aθ is as given in Assumption 1 and:
Ax = sup
‖xk‖≤1
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
Mi(xk)Pi
∥∥∥∥∥
a
A∆ = sup
xk∈∆P1×···×∆PI
‖xk‖
Proof. Consider any Adj(θ, θ′). Note that x(t+1)k (θ) =
x
(t+1)
k (θ
′) for any k 6= k∗, since with the loss vector given,
the update for population k only depends on θk.
‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ)− φ(x(t+1)(θ′); θ′)‖a
≤ ‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ)− φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ′)‖a + . . .
‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ′)− φ(x(t+1)(θ′); θ′)‖a
For the first term, since θ and θ′ are adjacent:
‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ)− φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ′)‖a
=
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
(θk∗)iMi(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi −
I∑
i=1
(θ′k∗)iMi(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi
∥∥∥∥∥
a
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
|(θk∗ − θ′k∗)i|Mi(x(t+1)k∗ (θ))Pi
∥∥∥∥∥
a
≤ c
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
Mi(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi
∥∥∥∥∥
a
≤ cAxA∆
For the second term, we invoke Proposition 5:
‖φ(x(t+1)(θ); θ′)− φ(x(t+1)(θ′); θ′)‖a
=
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
(θ′k∗)iMi(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi −
I∑
i=1
(θ′k∗)iMi(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ
′))Pi
∥∥∥∥∥
a
=
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
(θ′k∗)iMi
[
(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi − (x(t+1)k∗ (θ′))Pi
]∥∥∥∥∥
a
≤ Aθ
∥∥∥∥∥
I∑
i=1
Mi
[
(x
(t+1)
k∗ (θ))Pi − (x(t+1)k∗ (θ′))Pi
]∥∥∥∥∥
a
≤ AθAx
∥∥∥x(t+1)k∗ (θ)− x(t+1)k∗ (θ′)∥∥∥ ≤ cAθAx η(t)k∗ ‖ˆ`(t)‖∗`ψk∗
As desired.
We have bounded the effect of a change in the private
parameter on the flows. Thus, we can state the sensitivity of
the loss vector at time t+1 due to a small differential in the
private parameter θ, when the observed loss vector at time t
is held fixed.
Theorem 1. Sensitivity of the loss function: For any
Adj(θ, θ′):
‖`(x(t+1)(θ); θ, x(t), ˆ`(t))− `(x(t+1)(θ′); θ′, x(t), ˆ`(t))‖
≤ cA`Ax
[
A∆ +Aθ
maxk∈[K](η
(t)
k )‖ˆ`(t)‖∗
mink∈[K](`ψk)
]
Here, Ax, A∆, and Aθ are as defined in Assumption 1 and
Lemma 3, and A` denotes the Lipschitz constant of the
function ` : φ 7→ `(φ) with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖a on
the domain and ‖ · ‖ on the codomain.
Note that the sensitivity of `(t+1) depends on t through
the learning rate η(t)k .
V. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY OF THE ROUTING GAME
In this Section, we use results from the previous sections
to give privacy guarantees on the routing game when the loss
vectors are observed with Gaussian noise.
Also, recall that the Gaussian mechanism preserves (, δ)
differential privacy, and the privacy values depend on the
variance of the mechanism and the sensitivity of the function.
At each iteration t, we suppose that the populations observe
ˆ`(t) = `(x(t)) + Zt where (Zt)p
iid∼ Gauss(σ2).
We offer a couple of different interpretations of this
mechanism. The first is that the data collector adds Gaussian
noise before releasing this data to the populations. For
example, the Department of Transportation might choose
to add noise before transmitting the measurements from
inductive-loop detectors in the road for privacy purposes.
The second interpretation is that each driver experiences a
perturbed version of the nominal loss when driving along the
road, and when a population aggregates these perturbations,
they obey a central limit theorem and look roughly normal
in distribution.
First, we observe that for each path p, since the
loss function `p is continuous on the compact set(
∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI )K , it is bounded. Therefore, there exists
M > 0 such that for all x ∈ (∆P1 × · · · ×∆PI )K ,
‖`(x)‖∞ ≤M .
Theorem 2. After T iterations, the mapping θ 7→
(ˆ`(1), . . . , ˆ`(T )) is (, δ) differentially private, where:
 =
T∑
t=1
t δ =
T∑
t=1
exp
[
T∑
t′=t+1
t′
]
δt + δ
′
Here, a is any positive constant and δ′, t, δt are any con-
stants that satisfy the following constraints:
1− δ′ = (1− 2 exp(−a2/2σ2))T
∑I
i=1 |Pi|
t >
cA`Ax(2 ln(1.25/δt))
1/2
σ2
×[
A∆ +Aθ
maxk∈[K](η
(t)
k )(
∑I
i=1 |Pi|)1/2(M + a)
mink∈[K](`ψk)
]
Ax, A∆, Aθ, and A` are as defined in Assumption 1,
Lemma 3, and Theorem 1.
Proof. We can invoke the Chernoff bound and see that
P (|(Zt)p| > a) ≤ 2 exp(−a2/2σ2). It follows that the event
E = {‖Zt‖∞ ≤ a for all t} holds with at least probabil-
ity (1 − 2 exp(−a2/2σ2))T
∑I
i=1 |Pi|. On E, we have that
‖ˆ`(t)‖2 ≤ (
∑I
i=1 |Pi|)1/2‖ˆ`(t)‖∞ ≤ (
∑I
i=1 |Pi|)1/2(M +a)
a.s.
Invoking Theorem 1, we can see that, on E:
∆2`
(t+1) ≤
cA`Ax
[
A∆ +Aθ
maxk∈[K](η
(t)
k )(
∑I
i=1 |Pi|)1/2(M + a)
mink∈[K](`ψk)
]
Thus, invoking Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Lemma 2
yields our desired result.
Note that a can be chosen to be any positive constant,
and, in effect, provides a trade-off between the  and the δ
parameters.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider the routing game played on the network in
Figure 1, with the following populations:
1) Population P1 has mass vector θ1 = (1, 0), and follows
stochastic mirror descent dynamics with learning rates
O(t−.5).
2) Population P2 has mass vector θ2 = (.2, 1.2), and fol-
lows stochastic mirror descent dynamics with learning
rates O(t−.2).
v0
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
c(φ
) =
.4φ
c(φ) = .7φ
c(φ) =
.35φ
c(φ) = .9φ
c(φ
) =
.6φ
c(φ) =
φ
c(φ
)
=
.5
φ
c(φ
) =
2φ
c(φ) =
.2φ
c(
φ
)
=
.1
φ
Fig. 1. Example network with two origin-destination pairs: (v0, v6) and
(v1, v5).
The losses are taken to be linear. The resulting path loss
functions are bounded by M = 2. We simulate the game
for T = 200 iterations, with Gaussian noise with standard
deviation σ ∈ {.01, .1, .4}.
100 101 102
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
τ
E
[ f(x
(τ
)
)]
] −f
∗
σ = .01
σ = .1
σ = .4
Fig. 2. Potential function values f(x(τ)) as a function of the iteration
τ , for different values of σ. The solid and dotted lines show, respectively,
the average and the standard deviation over 150 runs of the simulation. The
dashed lines show the O˜(t−.2) asymptotic rate predicted by Proposition 4.
Figure 2 shows the values of the potential function for the
different values of σ. The asymptotic rate is consistent with
O˜(t−min(α1,α2)) = O˜(t−.2) rate predicted by Proposition 4.
The variance of the noise σ2 significantly affects the value of
the expected potential. The effect of σ can also be observed
in Figure 3, which shows the path flows for both populations,
for σ ∈ {.01, .4}. Besides the effect of the noise level, we
also observe that because the learning rates of population P2
have a slower decay rate, its updates are more aggressive,
which is reflected in the trajectories of its path flows.
Additionally, we consider the differential privacy of these
observable traffic flows. Applying Theorem 2, we plot the
differential privacy values as a function of the number of
iterations in Figure 4. Generally, we are able to mask a small
amount of population flow, but should c grow too large, the
bounds quickly become trivial, i.e. δ = 1. Furthermore, this
value at which we can no longer meaningfully guarantee
privacy can be thought of as the rate at which populations
must shift origin-destination pairs to retain some level of
privacy guarantee.
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Fig. 3. Path flows for each population, averaged over 150 runs, for σ = .01
(solid lines) and σ = .4 (dashed lines)
20 40 60 80
0
1
2
3
4
t

c = 10−6, σ = .1
c = 10−5, σ = .3
20 40 60 80
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
δ
c = 10−6, σ = .1
c = 10−5, σ = .3
Fig. 4. A plot of the values of , δ for which differential privacy holds,
as a function of t, the number of iterations. Here, (c, σ) are taken to be
(10−6, .1) then (10−5, .3), and a is taken to be 2. For larger values of c,
the privacy guarantees are only meaningful for shorter periods of time.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the privacy of the origins
and destinations of drivers when the nominal traffic losses
are observable with Gaussian noise. Considering a general
online learning model based on stochastic mirror descent,
and noting that the routing game is a potential game, we can
think of the dynamics of drivers as optimizing the Rosenthal
potential.
We analyzed the sensitivity of each update step as a
function of the masses for each origin-destination pair, which
allowed us to bound the influence of this private information
on the observable traffic losses. Additionally, we provided
bounds on the convergence rates for different levels of noise,
which provides insight into the relationship between how
long it takes traffic flows to settle at equilibrium and how
much is revealed by these observable traffic costs.
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